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HARMLESS ERROR: CONSTITUTIONAL SNEAK THIEF
STEVEN H. GOLDBERG*
"Harmless constitutional error" is among the
most insidious of legal doctrines. Since its promulgation by the United States Supreme Court in
Chapman v. Californial it has determined as many
criminal appeals as have some of the more well-2
known and hotly debated decisions of the 1960s.
Despite the frequency of its use in determining
criminal appeals-possibly as high as ten percent
of all criminal appeals during the last thirteen
years--it has received comparatively little critical
* Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas at Little
Rock School of Law; J.D., University of Minnesota, 1968;
B.A., Northwestern University, 1963.
1386 U.S. 18 (1967).
2 It is probably impossible to determine exactly how
many cases have been "determined" by a prior precedent.
Shepard's United States Citations lists in excess of 6000
citations to Chapman v. California. While some of those
citations probably represent cases which found the error
"harmful," Chapman is almost always cited as authority
for an appellate court's finding of "harmlessness." A
rough comparison with the page measure of the citations
to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), two of the major decisions
of the Warren Court, supports the proposition that Chapman has determined as many cases as almost any precedent from the decade. While both Miranda and Mapp are
cited more often, they are more often distinguished or
explained and frequently appear numerous times in the
same case.
3 The empirical research to establish the exact relationship between harmless constitutional error determinations and all criminal appeals is probably not worth
the effort. The available data and a couple of assumptions
make a fair argument for the likelihood of the 10 percent
estimate. While the Shepard's citations undoubtedly include some cases of harmful error and some multiple
citations in the same case, a number of cases are determined by a finding of harmless constitutional error without any mention of Chapman. Harrington v. California,
395 U.S. 250 (1969), provided a less rigorous test than
Chapman and is often cited in preference to Chapman.
Similarly, many state courts cite the state authority for
harmless constitutional error rather than Chapman. It is
not unreasonable to assume that the cases which do not
cite Chapman for the harmless error proposition are at
least as numerous as those that do and do not find the
error harmless. Something in excess of two-thirds of the
Shepard's citations to Chapman are in state cases.
The available data for harmless error as a percentage
of appellate decisions is found in Note, Harmful Use of
Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 538
(1979) (hereinafter Harmful Use). The Note presents a
comparison of all federal cases mentioning harmless error
to all cases in the federal circuits from 1960 through 1978.

attention.4 The reason for the inattention? It's a
sneak thief. Its appearance does not raise apprehension, and its application does not leave concentrated areas of obvious constitutional damage. The
doctrine does not aim at any closely guarded right.
It poses no consistent doctrinal challenge to important judicial determinations; nor does it consistently affect any police practice. Further, it looks
like the helpful, familiar doctrine of harmless error.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that

The data do not discriminate between harmless error and
harmless constitutional error. The markedly increased
percentage, and the even more dramatic increase in
absolute number of harmless error cases following the
Chapman opinion, when combined with the observation
that there is a rough approximation between the number
of federal harmless error cases presented in Harmful Use,
supra, and the federal citations in Shepard's for the same
period, lead to the conclusion that the number of harmless error cases which are not harmless constitutional
error is statistically insignificant.
During the last decade, civil cases outnumbered criminal cases in the federal circuits approximately four-toone. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACt OF THE UNITED STATES

(1979). In Harmful Use,

supra, the author estimates that 2.5 percent of all appellate
cases in the federal system are harmless error cases. If the
civil-to-criminal ratio in the states is comparable to that
of the federal system, then approximately 10 percent of
all criminal appellate cases throughout the country are
determined by a finding of harmless constitutional error.
Granting that the figure represents the roughest of approximations, the harmless constitutional error doctrine
is apparently a significant factor, at least by volume, in
criminal appellate decisionmaking.
4 When compared to the other major decisions of the
1960s, the harmless error case was ignored. The most
complete discussion of harmless error is R. TRAYNOR, THE
RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR

(1970). Field, Assessing the

Harmlessness ofFederalConstitutionalError-A Processin Need
of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15 (1977); Mause,
Harmless ConstitutionalError: The Implications of Chapman v.
California, 53 MIss. L. REV. 519 (1969); and Saltzburg,
The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988 (1973),
each deal with a particular aspect of the harmless constitutional error problem. A handful of student notes and
comments, the most complete of which is Note, Harmless
Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83 (1967), commented on the Chapman decision. While many of the
commentators presented a case for excluding one kind of
error or another from the reach of the harmless constitutional error doctrine, none criticized the doctrine as
being simply wrong.
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the doctrine of harmless constitutional error destroys important constitutional and institutional
values and therefore should be discarded.

Rule and developed the same backlog and delay
that plagued the English. Unlike the English, however, the American courts did not change the rule
and even in the early twentieth century were still

I.

leaving no error unremedied, no matter how inconsequential. Commentators labeled the courts "impregnable citadels of technicality,"' 1° and by all
accounts the label was warranted. Cases were often
tried more than once-and once, five times.i Convictions were overturned for matters as inconsequential as the omission of the word "the" before
12
the words "peace and dignity" in an indictment.
One particularly glaring example of delay involved
a widow who, twenty-three years after filing suit
for the proceeds of her husband's life insurance,
appeared before the Supreme Court for the second
time.' 3 Many lawyers placed error in the record as
a hedge against losing the verdict. 4 The situation
in the courts became intolerable to many members
of the organized bar, some judges, and a number
of legal scholars. They formed a loose coalition to
press for remedial legislation.is The reform movement resulted in "harmless error" legislation in
virtually everyjurisdiction.5 6 In the words ofJustice

HARMLESS

ERROR/HARMLESS

CONSTITUTIONAL

ERROR
The lack of apparent concern for the doctrine of
harmless constitutional error is attributable, at
least in part, to the assumption that harmless constitutional error is simply another variety of harmless error. In fashioning a "harmless-constitutionalerror rule" 5 for the seven-member Chapman majority, Justice Hugo Black made a special attempt to
tie his new rule to the harmless error statutes extant
in the various jurisdictions: "All 50 States have
harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United
States long ago through its Congress established
for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be
reversed for 'errors or defects which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.' ,6
Harmless constitutional error is different from
harmless error generally, and that difference begins
with the statutes and rules in the fifty states. The
various harmless error statutes state, in one fashion
or another, that a trial result shall not be reversed
on appeal unless the trial included a "substantial
7
wrong or miscarriage.", The language and the
concept originated in England. The method and
reason for its eventual transplantation to the
United States bears upon whether harmless error
is a persuasive precedent for the harmless constitutional error doctrine.
Commentators generally believe the 1835 case of
Crease v. Barrett created the Exchequer Rule which
states that prejudice presumptively attends every
9
trial error. The rule resulted in such overcrowding
in the English courts that litigation seemed to

survive until the parties expired. Faced with more
retrials than new trials, the English created a harmless error rule for civil litigation which prohibited
reversal absent substantial wrong.
The American courts adopted the Exchequer
" 386 U.S. at 22. The phrase is Justice Black's own
description of what Justice Stewart considered to be a
"break with settled precedent." Id. at 22 (quoting id. at
45 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
6Id. at 22 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2111 (1966)).
7 See 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, rule 6, sched. 1. (1873).
" I C.M. & R. 919, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835).
9Wigmore first blamed Crease for the rule, and most
commentators have accepted that genealogy. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 4, argues persuasively that the
Exchequer Rule was not invented by Baron Parke in
Crease, but rather by the judges who misread the precedent in applying Crease to the case of the moment.

10Kavanaugh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal
Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, 11 A.B.A.J. 217, 222
(1925).

" Pressley v. Bloomington and Normal Ry. & Light
Co., 271 Ill.
622, ill N.E. 511 (1916), was retried four
times without a substantial error.
12State v. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 109 S.W. 706
(1908).
13Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. v. Hillmori, 145 U.S.
285 (1892), 188 U.S. 208 (1903), might have become a
national tragedy had the "widow" not been very youngand thereby likely to outlive the lawsuit to spend her
winnings-and had there been no suspicion that her
husband was not really a "corpse" and she, therefore, not
really a "widow."
14 There was considerable pressure to create a federal
harmless error statute with application to civil cases only.
See S. REP. No. 1066, 62nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1911-12).
Criminal cases were nonetheless included because, according to Justice Rutledge in Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946), the "criminal trial
became a game for sowing reversible error in the record,
only to have repeated the same matching of wits when a
new trial had been thus obtained."
"5The organized bar spearheaded the coalition, aided
by its powerful, if not succinctly named, Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed
Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation. Pound, Taft, Wigmore, Hadley, and Frankfurter
were only some of the legal community leaders involved
in the coalition.
16 Some of the harmless error rules, for instance the
California constitutional harmless error rule, antedated
the reform movement. Most of the statutes and rules,
however, were passed during the quarter century in which
the coalition was actively involved in lobbying.
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Frankfurter the purpose and limits of the harmless less. It could have decided that courts should judge
error legislation were: "to prevent matters con- federal constitutional error by a federal standard
cerned with the mere etiquette of trials and with of harmlessness. It might have separated the excluthe formalities and minutiae of procedure from sionary rule from the fourth amendment and detouching the merits of a verdict."' 7
termined that the admission of the evidence was
With this background, the issue of harmless not constitutional error. The Court chose none of
constitutional error came to the Supreme Court in these alternatives. Instead the Court held that Fahy
1963. Until Fahy v. Connecticut,'0 no court had sug- was entitled to a new trial because the Connecticut
gested that a federal constitutional error might be court wrongly believed that the admission of the
harmless. The Court had never given any serious evidence would not prejudice Fahy.23 Chief Justice
consideration to the question, and no constitutional Warren, writing for the majority, failed to clarify
error had gone unremedied by reversal.'" Fahy the basis of the Court's power to instruct a state on
came to the Court in the backwash of Mapp v. the interpretation of its own laws.2' More imporOhio20 as the states were beginning to struggle with tantly, the opinion is not clear on whether Conthe proposition that the fourth amendment limi- necticut read its facts right and its test wrong or its
tations upon search and seizure, and the exclusion- test right and its facts wrong.25 The single clear
ary rule remedy for violation of those limitations, proposition to be gleaned from Fahy is that, had
were fully applicable to the states. The state the Connecticut court done its job correctly, it
charged Fahy and a friend with painting swastikas might have found the federal constitutional error
on a synagogue in violation of its law against to be harmless.
willful injury to public buildings. At Fahy's trial,
Chapman v. California,0 the "harmless error" case,
the state introduced the paint and brush used for came four years after Fahy. Significantly, Chapman
the artwork. On appeal, the Connecticut court held did not involve a fourth amendment violation.
that the search for and seizure of the paint and Justices Stewart and White, who had joined Justice
brush from the Fahy garage violated the fourth
Harlan's dissent in Fahy, did not join him in Chapamendment and that Mapp required their exclusion
man. Insofar as Justice Harlan's position was not
from evidence. 2' The court refused, however, to significantly different on the relationship between
reverse the conviction, holding that the error in the harmless error and constitutional error, it is fair to
admission of the paint and brush had not "mater- conclude that the fourth amendment exclusionary
27
ially injured the appellant" under Connecticut's
rule presents special problems for harmless error.
harmless error rule.'s
2 "From the foregoing it clearly appears that the
The Supreme Court might have pursued several
erroneous admission of this illegally obtained evidence
alternatives in Fahy. It could have decided that
was prejudicial to petitioner and hence it cannot be
federal constitutional error never could be harmcalled harmless error." 375 U.S. at 91-92.
17308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
18 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
19See, e.g., Gibbs, PrejudicialError: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in the FederalCourts, 3 VIL.L. REv. 48, 67
(1957).Justice Harlan, dissenting in Chapman, cited Motes
v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), in response to
Justice Stewart's claim that constitutional error had always led to reversal. 386 U.S. at 50. Saltzburg, supra note
4, at 1001, suggests that Motes may not have been viewed
as anything more than a waiver of constitutional rights
through Motes' admission of guilt, which amounted to a
guilty plea. Regardless of Motes' "true" meaning, the
matter of harmless constitutional error was never raised
or argued in the Supreme Court before Fahy. Justice
Rutledge, in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. at 76465, said in dictum that only constitutional norms and
specific commands of Congress could insulate error from
the federal harmless error statute.
20367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21 Connecticut v. Fahy, 149 Conn. 577, 586, 183 A.2d
256, 261 (1962).
22 Id. at 588, 183 A.2d at 262; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52265 (1958).

24Justice Harlan in dissent questioned the Court's
power to' instruct Connecticut upon the proper interpretation of its own harmless error statute. "Evidentiary
questions of this sort are not a proper part of this Court's
business, particularly in cases coming here from state
courts over which this Court possesses no supervisory
power." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. at 92 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
25 The majority opinion goes out of its way to discuss
the facts. However, as the dissent points out, reinterpreting the facts is not the task of the United States Supreme
Court. Although Connecticut's statute is potentially as
rigorous for harmless error as any test the Court might
promulgate, the opinion states a harmless error test different from that which Connecticut applied under its
own statute. The test which Warren stated in framing
the "factual" issue placed the burden on the state to show
no "reasonable possibility" that the error contributed to
the verdict. It is unlikely that Connecticut read its harmless error test similarly.
26 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
2 The exclusionary rule presents special problems in
a number of contexts. A familiar contention is that most
of the procedural cases, see, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381
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Chapman involved California's constitutional rule
which allowed the prosecutor to argue to the jury
the defendant's failure to testify.28 Chapman and
a codefendant were charged with a number of
crimes, including murder. They chose not to testify
at their trial, and the prosecutor made a vigorous
argument based upon their failure to explain and
contradict the state's evidence. After their trial, but
before their appeal, the United States Supreme
9
Court decided Griffin v. Califomia.2 In Griffin, the

Court held that the California comment rule unconstitutionally eroded the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination by making its assertion costly. The California Supreme Court recognized the applicability of Griffin to Chapman's
case, but held that under California's test for harm3
less error the comment to the jury was harmless. 0
The Chapman opinion is, in its own fashion, as
strange as Fahy. Justice Harlan, who did not understand the source of the Fahy Court's power to
instruct Connecticut on its own law, had similar
difficulty with the source of the Chapman Court's
power to create a federal harmless error standard,
particularly, given Justice Black's observation that
Congress might impose a different standard. 31 He
concluded that the majority, in a "startling constitutional development" had assumed "a general
supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in state courts." 32 Former Chief
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court
read Justice Black's opinion quite differently, concluding that the Chapman rule was not constitution-

U.S. 618 (1965), and Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976), represent reactions to the exclusionary principle
rather than antipathy to the right involved. Chapman,
although not an exclusionary rule case, was decided with
the exclusionary rule in the very near background. Further, the exclusionary rule significantly affected the decision to the extent that it tempered Stewart's otherwise
uncompromising position that constitutional error was
different as a class for purposes of harmless error.
' CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 13.
29380 U.S. 609 (1965).
3oPeople v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 P:2d 209, 45
Cal. Rptr. 729 (1965).
31386 U.S. at 45 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The limits of
federal power-and certainly court power-is the central
theme ofJustice Harlan's dissent. He makes the argument
more completely than he did in Fahy. His dissent, and
the failure ofJustices Stewart and White to join it, is the
best argument for two propositions: (1)the exclusionary
rule alone accounted for the Court's avoidance of the
harmless error issue in Fahy, and (2) the Chapman determination that federal constitutional error requires a different and more rigorous harmless error test is a "constitutional judgment."
2Id. at

45, 46.
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ally based but rather was an interpretation of the
3
federal harmless error statute.s
Much of the difficulty with Chapman is the result
of its posture in the Supreme Court, the positions
of the parties, and the Court's response to those
positions.34 The California Supreme Court apparently had concluded that the evidence of guilt
presented to the jury was so "overwhelming" that
the error was harmless.3s The state contended that
its harmless error rule represented the proper test.
The defendant contended that no constitutional
36
error could ever be harmless. The majority opinion rejected both contentions and fashioned a federal harmless error standard. In so doing, Justice
Black held that federal constitutional error was

sufficiently different from common error to require
a different standard,37 but not sufficiently different
38
to prohibit any standard at all. For the latter

4, at 38-42.
4 In the most technical sense, the language in Chapman

33 R. TRAYNOR, supra note

concerning the nature of the harmless constitutional error
may be considered dictum. Chapman is the authority used
by many appellate courts to find harmless constitutional
error, but Chapman did not find such an error. The
California court found the error to be harmless; the
United States Supreme Court found only that California's use of its own test for harmlessness was wrong.
3 Whether Chapman disapproved the California test or
the way the California courts were interpreting that test
is unclear. The issue of whether there is a difference
between the "overwhelming evidence" and the "effect of

the evidence" tests, and whether that difference matters,
is born in Chapman: "The California-constitutional rule
emphasizes 'a miscarriage of justice,' but the California
courts have neutralized this to some extent by emphasis,
and perhaps overemphasis, upon the court's view of
'overwhelming evidence.' We prefer the approach of this
Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent
case of Fahy v. Connecticut." 386 U.S. at 23.
"6 The defense maintained an alternative position that
if all constitutional error did not require automatic reversal, the error in their particular case was prejudicial.
That position eventually prevailed. For the purpose of

this article, the first position, automatic reversal, is of
interest.
37 With faithfulness to the constitutional union of
the States, we cannot leave to the States the for-

mulation of the authoritative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people from infractions by

the States of federally guar.nteed [constitutional]
rights.... In the absence of appropriate congressional action, it is our responsibility to protect [federal constitutional rights] by fashioning the necessary rule.

386 U.S. at 21.
38 All of these rules, state or federal, serve a very
useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside
convictions for small errors or defects that have

little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result
of the trial. We conclude that there may be some
constitutional errors which in the setting of a par-

ticular case are so unimportant and insignificant

1980]
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proposition, he relied upon the harmless error statutes of the fifty states, observing that they failed to
distinguish "between federal constitutional errors
and errors of state law or federal statutes and
rules." 39 These were the same harmless error statutes which he found inadequately designed to protect federally guaranteed rights.40 Commentators
have observed that Chapman might be read to reject
the method of measure-"overwhelming evidence"-the California court used in applying its
harmless error statute.4 ' Others have suggested that
the Chapman test is the measure for the federal
harmless error statute.42 Some have concluded that
the Chapman rule is a new constitutional incursion
into matters properly the sole concern of the
states. 43 Still others have suggested that a later case,
In re Winship, requires application of the Chapman
rule for all error-constitutional or not-in a criminal trial.
The Chapman test for harmless constitutional error, regardless of its foundation orjustification, was
the same test that Chief Justice Warren had "suggested" to the Connecticut court in Fahy: "Before
a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 45 In

that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.
Id. at 22.
9 "All 50 States have harmless-error statutes or rules,
and the United States long ago through its Congress
established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not
be reversed for 'errors or defects which do not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."' Id.
40Id.

41 Much

of Justice Brennan's dissent in Harrington v.
California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), takes this approach
although it does not suggest that the California rule is at
issue. Field, supra note 4, contains an extensive discussion
of the "overwhelming evidence" measure and its applicability to current harmless error cases.
42R. TRAYNR, supra note 4, at 37-42.
4 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 45-46 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
44397 U.S. 358 (1970). See Saltzburg, supra note 4, at
991. Professor Saltzburg's argument that any method of
"overwhelming evidence" examination requires the appellate court to use a reasonable doubt test in order to
comply with due process is persuasive. Id. at 1009-20.
This position takes no account of the "class" of the error,
but focuses upon the appellate fact review function and
demands that the appellate jury be bound by the same
test as the petit jury. He might have carried his point
further. See text accompanying notes 64-109 infra for a
discussion of the appropriateness of any appellate factfinding in a criminal case.
4"386 U.S. at 24.

adopting the Fahy test explicitly, Justice Black
observed that "the beneficiary of a constitutional
error" carried the burden of demonstrating46that
the error "did not contribute to the verdict.,
Save for the reference to the harmless error
statutes which grew out of the law reform movement of the early twentieth century, Justice Black
presented no authority for the proposition that a
constitutional violation might be harmless. His
brief discussion of the statutes presents no clues as
to what it is about their enactment or their foundation which would theoretically
support a harm47
less constitutional error rule.
Ironically, Justice Stewart, who dissented from
the Court's interference with Connecticut's application of its own harmless error statute to the
unconstitutional search in Fahy, and dissented from
the Court's determination that the California comment rule "cost" Griffin anything he had not previously spent,48 argued that the Griffin error, being
constitutional, required automatic reversal of
Chapman's conviction. Justice Stewart's Chapman
concurrence emphasized that, despite ample opportunity, the Court had never paused to inquire
if a constitutional violation was harmful, reversing
in most instances in which such a violation was
found. He was not, however, willing to draw the
harmlessness line between constitutional error and
all other error. Noting that Griffin error did not
present the appropriate vehicle for breaking with
"settled precedent,

49

Justice Stewart indicated a

willingness to place exclusionary
rule error in the
"all other" category. °

46 id.

47

Justice Black sat on both the Bruno and Kotteakos
Courts and was as familiar as anyone with the history
and purpose of the harmless error statutes which developed out of the law reform movement. He undoubtedly
knew that the reason the statutes made no distinction
between constitutional error and common error was that
nobody proposing or passing the statutes ever dreamed
that anybody would ever suggest that the "minutiae"
with which they were dealing would include a constitutional guarantee. One can only speculate that Justice
Black felt the need of some historical support and
clutched at the first arguably relevant straw.
48 Stewart's Griffin dissent was essentially
a harmlessness approach in the first instance. He could not see how
telling a jury something they already knew-that the
defendant had not testified-could matter in the result.
He was, therefore, unwilling to agree that the exercise of
the fifth amendment right cost anything. 380 U.S. at
620-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49386 U.S. at 45.

s°Justice Stewart says that "constitutional rights are
not fungible goods" as a preface to his position that while
automatic reversal has been the rule, the right case might
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Just.as Justice Stewart seemed to be willing to
include certain constitutional error on the harmless
error side, Justice Black seemed to concede that
certain constitutional error requires automatic reversal. Without embracing the precedents, Black
observed that "prior cases have indicated that there
are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial
can never be treated as harmthat their infraction
5
less error." '
Though Chapman may have left more questions
than it answered, it established the possibility of a
harmless constitutional error, wrapping the doctrine in the cloak of that harmless error doctrine
words, dealt with
which, in Justice Frankfurter's
'5 2
the "minutiae of procedure."

I.

THE SNEAK THIEF

Chapman received little notice when it was decided because many commentators agreed privately with the public assessment that "the possibility that a particular error will be found 'harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt' seems slight." 53Only
Justice Harlan expected Chapman to have any impact on judicial review of convictions, and his
expectation was that the federal courts would become increasingly involved in what he considered
'
to be "state-judicial domains." Both predictions
present a place for harmless error. His only example, and
obvious choice for the place, is the exclusionary rule.
While he speaks in terms of a constitutional right, it is
clear that he does so by force of precedent rather than
personal conviction. His footnote to the subject leads one
to believe that he is more interested in returning the
exclusionary rule to the realm of common error than he
is in creating a harmless constitutional error rule. Id. at
44 n.2.
s' 386 U.S. at 23. Justice Black cites three examples,
id. at 23 n.8: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(right to counsel); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)
(coerced confession), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927) (impartial judge). Justice Stewart cites additional
instances in which automatic reversal is indicated. Justice
Black gives no reason for those he selects, does not
necessarily endorse the result, and provides no clue as to
what characteristic unifies the cases past his "so basic to
a fair trial" language. Given his total incorporation approach to due process, see Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), it is unlikely that
he means to suggest that there is a constitutional difference among rights found within the first eight amendments. His citation, like Justice Stewart's, may be the
result of frustration with the process of trying to set a
code of procedure from the Bill of Rights, and striking a
reasonable balance between clear rules and flexible application.
52 Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
"3 The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 205
(1967).
54 386 U.S. at 57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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were wrong. The "slight" possibility became a
common occurrence in both the state and federal
courts, 5s and the federal courts did not use Chapman
as a tool for fixing their own notion of "harm"
upon state courts with contrary views. There is
some irony in the fact that, on the 6ontrary, Chapman became the magic formula by which the state
courts found harmless constitutional error in record
numbers-findings to 56which the federal courts gave
substantial deference.
Although Chapman remains the most commonly
cited authority for the proposition that any particular constitutional error is harmless, it may not be
accurate to ascribe the significant evils of the doctrine to the Chapman opinion. Although Chapman
introduced the harmless constitutional error, the
doctrine as presented possessed only the potential,
not the doctrinal structure, for constitutional and
institutional mischief. Traynor thought the Chapman test to be so stringent as to be tantamount to
57
an automatic reversal rule. Had the Supreme
Court interpreted and the other appellate courts
applied Chapman to allow a finding of harmlessness
only after an appellate court had examined the
error alone and found beyond a reasonable doubt
that it could not have contributed to the verdict,
the predictions of inconsequence might have
proven correct. Cases decided after Chapman relaxed the rigor of the test and applied it to circumstances which could not have been contemplated,
and indeed, would have been disavowed by the
Chapman majority.
Any new doctrine or exception to an established
doctrine must be expected to grow past the parameters set in the decision which created it. The
harmless constitutional error doctrine has a char' The data from Harmful Use, supra note 3, at 544-48,
on the incidence of harmless error indicate the federal
courts perhaps were as anxious as the state courts to use
a mechanism which would allow them to find a constitutional error and still affirm the conviction.
' Because a finding that an error is harmless is a
factual determination, there is little realistic opportunity
for review by the federal courts of a state appellate court
decision. An interesting exception is the kind of case
where the state appellate court finds an error harmless
and the federal court need not second guess the state
appellate court's reading of the statute in order to find
that there was harm in the error. Allison v. Gray, 603
F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1979), is an example of such a case.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the failure to
allow a defendant to present alibi testimony was error,
but harmless. Allison v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 14, 214 N.W.2d
437, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071 (1974). The Seventh Circuit
reversed, noting that the Wisconsin court could not possibly judge the weight or effect of alibi evidence that was
not in the record.
17 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 43.
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acteristic unique among doctrines with constitutional impact that makes such growth immediate,
indiscriminate, and unpredictable. It has no substantive doctrinal base. As a result, the doctrine has
become a major thief of constitutional rights without any particular notice or analysis. Unlike the
substantive constitutional decisions such as Mapps5
Miranda,5 9 and Wade,60 or even the procedural con61
stitutional decisions such as Linkletter v. Walker,
harmless constitutional error carries with it no legal
issue of primary concern to an appellant. Appellants are unable to launch a consistent and effective
attack against the doctrine because no single appellant has any doctrinal stake in the issue. Each
appellant hopes only to avoid the factual trap of
harmless constitutional error. He has little opportunity to challenge on the factual issue, let alone
on the propriety of the doctrine.62 Consequently,
the courts failed to provide analysis in the development of harmless constitutional error. That failure has created an appellate procedural doctrine
which has caused "mischief'6 beyond anyone's
expectations. The doctrine has created appellate
factfinding which denies the constitutionally guaranteed right to trial by jury. In addition, the
doctrine erodes constitutional principles at all
levels of the criminal justice system from prosecution to Supreme Court review without ever affording an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of
the principle eroded.
III. "... A FAMILIAR STANDARD"
Justice Black's observation that the reasonable
doubt standard was a familiar one to appellate
5 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (searches).
69Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confessions).
6 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (line
uP 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (retroactivity).
62The nature of the harmless error determination is
such that an appellant cannot argue its inapplicability
without an implicit concession that the inquiry isjustified
and without taking valuable time and energy away from
persuading the court that there is error in the first
instance. Further, few appeals proceed with the full
record available to the appellate court or sufficient time
for the appellant to adequately parse the record to establish the harmlessness of an error that the appellate court
has not yet found.
6Justice Black anticipated that harmless error rules
could create "mischievous results when, for example,
highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument,
though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial in
which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one."
386 U.S. at 22. He did not anticipate the mischief which
the doctrine might bring to the appellate process or to
constitutional guarantees.
64"While appellate courts do not ordinarily have the

courts identifies precisely the problem which arose
after the Supreme Court decided Harrington v. California.65 Appellate courts never operate as factfinders for matters which must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt. They rarely operate as
fact-finders at all. 66 Most importantly, until the
Court approved the "overwhelming evidence" approach to harmless constitutional error, no court
had the power to enter a guilty verdict on its own
properly exercised
judgment when the defendant
67
his right to a trial by jury.
Because Chapman seemed to reject the California
court's "overwhelming evidence" approach to
harmless error, and to approve a test that required
the court to focus instead on whether the error
contributed to the verdict, Glenn Harrington's
murder conviction would likely not stand. Harrington, a caucasian, and three blacks were jointly
tried and convicted of murder. Each of Harrington's alleged accomplices confessed. Their confessions were admitted at the trial in violation of the
rule of Bruton v. United States, s prohibiting the
introduction, against a codefendant, of another's
confession when that other individual did not take
the stand and thereby submit to confrontation by
his codefendant. It is difficult to imagine how any
court, focusing only upon the illegally admitted
confessions, could determine beyond a reasonable
doubt that the confessions of the accomplices did
not contribute to Harrington's conviction-particularly when those confessions described the fourth
participant as "the white guy."9 Harrington made

original task of applying such a test, it is a familiar
standard to all courts .... "Id. at 24.
6 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
66 Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
exemplary of the reticence of appellate courts to review,
let alone make initial determinations of fact. "Findings
of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(a).
67 The appellate court's action in finding an error
harmless by assessing the weight of the remainder of the
evidence is not, in a technical sense, the direction of a
verdict nor the granting of a judgment n.o.v. to the
government. However, it is a determination of guilt upon
facts which have never been considered by a jury and
which, given the appellate court's finding of guilt, never
will be.
68 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
69 None of the defendants mentioned Harrington by
name. The Court, however, accepted Harrington's argument that, when the defendants said "the white guy,"
there was not much doubt who the speaker had in mind
as Harrington sat in the dock with three blacks. 395 U.S.
at 253.
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statements which, according to the Court, "fell
short of a confession but which placed him at the
scene of the crime." 70 According to Justice Douglas,
writing for a five-member majority, those statements and other evidence were "so overwhelming"
that the admission of the co-defendant's
confession
was harmless beyond a reasonable
71
doubt.
The Harrington majority, which included Justice
Black, the author of Chapman, stated emphatically
that they did not "depart from Chapman; nor ...
dilute it by inference., 72 Justice Brennan, joined
by ChiefJustice Warren and Justice Marshall, took
exception, contending that Chapman had been overruled: "The Court today by shifting the inquiry
from whether the constitutional error contributed
to the conviction to whether the untainted evidence
provided 'overwhelming' support for the conviction puts aside the firm resolve of Chapman .... 73
Harrington was followed by the remarkably similar case of Schneble v. Florida.74 Although the dissenters, including Justice Douglas, the author of Harrington, complained bitterly that Schneble's reliance
upon Harrington was misplaced, the majority used
the "overwhelming evidence" approach that Jus75
tice Douglas had adopted for the Harringtonfacts.
In addition, Justice Rehnquist's pointed use of
"probability" 76 language from the Harrington decision, plus his own peculiar phrasing of the Chapman
holding,77 left the burden of proof unclear, both as
to what it was and who was to carry it. After
Schneble, one may argue reasonably that an appellate court faced with an error of constitutional
7

0Id.

at 252.

71 Id. at

254.

72 id.

73 Id. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
75 "Not only is the independent evidence of guilt here

overwhelming, as in Harrington.... " Id. at 431.
76
Although it is unlikely that Justice Douglas intended
to change the test from beyond a reasonable doubt to one
of probability, he used language in Harrington which
Justice Rehnquist was able to use to support such a
change: "Our own reading of the record and on what
seems to us to have been the probable impact ... on the
minds of an averagejury." Id. at 432 (quoting Harrington
v. California,
395 U.S. at 254).
77
Justice Black put the burden of demonstration upon
the prosecution, "requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained." 386 U.S. at 24. Justice Rehnquist implied that
the demonstration must be made by the defendant:
"Thus, unless there is a reasonable possibility that the
improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, reversal is not required." 405 U.S. at 432.
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dimension should make its own independent evaluation of the evidence, and reverse the conviction
only if it was persuaded that the average jury
would have changed its verdict had the illegal
evidence been excluded. 78 By a subtle rearrangement of words and ideas, Justice Rehnquist converted a test which forced the prosecution to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict, into a test which forced
the defendant to show that the error was of such
significance that without it the defendant would
be entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.7 9
Most of the commentary concerned with harmless constitutional error has focused upon subclasses
of constitutional rights which, in the minds of the
commentators, ought to be exempt from harmless
error analysis.80 These commentators focused on
the nature of the constitutional right violated
rather than the nature of the process by which the
harmlessness is determined.8 For the most part
they follow Justice Black's position and have concentrated on constitutional error which affects the
"process" of the trial, such as failure of counsel or
discrimination in the selection of a jury panel,
rather than on those errors which affect the amount
of evidence presented. They have argued that when
a violation of the right is either harmless by definition-jury accessS 2-or beyond precise determination-effective assistance of counsel84-harmless
78ChiefJustice Burger's opinion in Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475 (1978), rejects the contention that harmless

error analysis is appropriate when a defendant raises a
failure of effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict
of interest. His rejection is based upon the proposition
that "a rule requiring the defendant to show that a
conflict of interests ... prejudiced him ... " would not
be susceptible to evenhanded application as is required
in harmless error analysis. There can be little doubt from
his explanation that he considers the defendant to have
the burden of demonstration with respect to harmless
error.
79
justice Rehnquist's statement that "[i]n this case,
we conclude that the 'minds of an average jury' would
not have found the State's ease significantly less persuasive had the testimony as to Snell's admission been
excluded," can only be read in the context of his opinion
to mean that the jury verdict would not have been
different. 405 U.S. at 432. The effect is to make the
harmless constitutional error test the equivalent of a
guilty or not guilty determination, allowing only those
who can demonstrate to the appellate court that they are
not guilty as a matter of law-that is, can demonstrate a
reasonable doubt as to the entire case-to gain a new
trial when constitutional rights are abridged.
See, e.g., Mause, supra note 4.
o See, e.g., Note, Harmless ConstitutionalError, 20 STAN.
L. REV. 83 (1967).
82 Field, supra note 4, at 19-20.
8 Mause, supra note 4, at 541.
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constitutional error analysis is inappropriate. None
has suggested that the harmless constitutional error
process itself violates the defendant's right to a trial
byjury.'
When an appellate court tests for harmlessness
by reviewing the record to determine whether the
remainder of the evidence is so overwhelming that
the error did not contribute to the verdict, it sits as
an appellate jury.85 The test assumes that the error
made a difference in the amount of evidence presented to the jury.86 When the appellate court
8' Professor Saltzburg has suggested that the Chapman
rule is required for all error in a criminal case-be it
constitutional or common-by virtue of the due process
clause and the right to trial by jury. Saltzburg, supra note
4, at 991-93. Professor Mause briefly raised the possibility
that the jury trial guarantee made any harmless constitutional error rule unconstitutional, but rejected the
proposition because nothing requires a state to provide
appellate review of any kind in a criminal case. Mause,
supra note 4, at 531-32. Professor Saltzburg raised the
same problem for his proposition that the jury trial right
precluded any test but Chapman's reasonable doubt test
for all error in criminal trials. Saltzburg, supra note 4, at
1028. Saltzburg was probably correct with respect to
common error. Mause was undoubtedly wrong with respect to constitutional error. States cannot avoid federal
review, upon habeas corpus, for error of a constitutional
nature. It follows that any jury trial problem resulting
from application of a harmless error rule cannot be set
aside for constitutional error, although it may be for
common error.
85 Professor Field, supra note 4, at 39, suggests that the
Harrington test is not really "overwhelming evidence" but
"cumulative evidence." Whatever merit there may be to

the distinction, the appellate court must, in the first
instance, make ajudgment about the quantity or quality
of the remainder of the evidence. Professor Saltzburg,
supra note 4 at 1014, n.89, argues that there is no practical
difference between the effect of the evidence test and the

overwhelming evidence test so long as the appellate court
uses a "virtually certain" or beyond a reasonable doubt
test on the remainder of the evidence. He maintains that
in any instance where the overwhelming evidence test
leaves the Court with the belief that the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt it would also find that

the error had made no contribution to the verdict. While
that may often be the case, it is not necessarily so. For
example, in Allison v. Gray, 603 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1979),

the evidence would leave the average skeptic convinced
of the defendant's guilt. However, the error was failure
to allow the defendant to present alibi evidence. Under
the effect of the error test, the exclusion of the defendant's
evidence could never be harmless. Regardless of whether
it would often lead to the same result, the appellate
activity in the effect of the evidence test is a traditional
appellate exercise of determining a factual "could" by
assuming all facts in a light most favorable to the party
without the appellate burden, while in the overwhelming
evidence test the court is reaching an original fact judgment.
8o Professor Field suggests that the overwhelming evi-

decides that the evidence presented to the jury
minus (or plus) the evidence produced (or excluded) by the error, it is the only factfinder which
has ever made a guilty/not guilty judgment about
the new amount of evidence.
An appellate court's determination that a set of
facts supports a guilty verdict, in the first instance,
is unprecedented. The failure of precedent reflects
a consistent and long tem judgment about the
wisdom and constitutionality of such an appellate
determination. For reasons so familiar that Justice
Brennan did not think repetition was necessary in
Harrington,appellate courts restrict their factfinding
activity to the review of what a previous factfinder
found. 7 The review is limited to determinations
that the factfinder's conclusion cannot be justified
even when all of the evidence is viewed in a light
most favorable to the conclusion.88
An appellate court defies common sense when it
steps out of its traditional role as a reviewing court
and attempts to operate as a primary factfinder.
Appellate review of an entire trial transcript is an
incredibly inefficient use of appellate court time.
To pursue such a course in order to determine
whether error is harmless, so that judicial economy
might be served is not only ironic, it is nonsensical.89 In addition, unless the litigants are placed on
dence test may be applicable to constitutional errors at
trial which do not affect the amount of evidence presented to the jury. Field, supra note 4, at 16. None of the
Supreme Court decisions finding harmless constitutional
error has involved an error which did not affect the
amount of evidence. Those cases to reject harmless constitutional error treatment for particular error have involved errors which did not quantifiably affect the
amount of evidence. While the necessary speculation
involved with such analysis has never been assigned as a
reason for excluding all such error from harmlessness
analysis, it seems to be the rationale from case to case.
See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
87 395 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See discussion at text accompanying notes 91-98 infra, for the oftcited factors militating against appellate factfinding.
88 Justice Rehnquist misused the familiar sufficiency of

the evidence test in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427.
He relied upon Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 352
U.S. 500 (1957),'to support a factfinding presumption in
favor of the government on an issue for which it had the
burden of proof. 405 U.S. at 432. Justice Marshall, in
dissent, wasted no time in pointing out that the appellate
function in determining the sufficiency of the evidence in
a civil case was exactly the opposite of the function set
out by the harmless error test, and employed a presumption exactly opposite of that underlying the reasonable

doubt burden. 405 U.S. 433-34.
89Justice Stewart, concurring in Chapman, alludes to
the difficulty of an appellate court reviewing each transcript from case to case in order to determine harmless-
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notice that the error is conceded and harmlessness
is the only issue, the appellate court must review
the entire transcript and make a determination
without the benefit of the litigants' view of the
facts-a substantial departure from the normal
method of appellate review. To the extent that
appellate time is saved by the litigants' shaping
and narrowing the issues, the inability of the litigants to contribute to the-appellate decisionmaking
process harms the litigants and wastes court time.
Unless the courts adopt a policy of total fact review
°
first and legal issue second,9 the appellate court
cannot begin the time-consuming task of fact review until it has taken the time to perform its
traditional function of reviewing for and, in this
case, finding error. From the perspective of efficient

appellate practice only-judicial economy of a
kind-the harmless constitutional error doctrine
involves a tremendous increase in appellate court
time and a diminution of the traditional assistance
that counsel provides.
From an institutional perspective, the time cost
is not as substantial as the cost injustice. Appellate
courts are, by their position as dispassionate and
removed arbiters of the law, extremely poor finders
of fact. Appellate courts' deference to trial court
9
factfinding is not a matter of accident. A cold
record, assuming that it is accurate, cannot substitute for a trial. Every trial lawyer knows that the
"facts" of demeanor are at least as important as
the "facts" of testimony. An appellate court read92
ing a record in its entirety knows nothing of the
unreasonable pause, the inappropriate smile, the
sarcasm that changes a "sure" which means "yes"
ness, and then candidly admits that "[t]his burdensome
obligation is one that we here are hardly qualified to
discharge." 386 U.S. at 45.
90 In Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), over
the vigorous dissent of four justices, Chief Justice Burger
stood appellate procedure on its head. He assumed the
error-the real question in the case-and proceeded, so
he said, to review the entire record to make a harmlessness
determination.
9i "Such deference is particularly apposite because the
trial judge and jury are closest to the trial scene and thus
are afforded the best opportunity to evaluate contradictory testimony." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 408
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9 There is no way to insure that judges read the entire
transcript. Given the volume in most appellate courts, it
stretches the imagination to believe that even one of the
judges would read the entire record. In fact, most matters
come to appellate courts with abbreviated records collected in an appendix by litigants to whom harmlessness
has not occurred. The appendix and record are chosen
for relevance to the legal issues raised. Good practice and
appellate rules encourage the abbreviated record.
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to a "sure" which means "I don't believe that" or
"I don't agree." Appropriately, every trial court
instructs the jury that it is the sole judge of witness
credibility. Rule 52's admonition that appellate
courts in civil cases shall give "due regard ...to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses"93 is no accident. One
of the problems with appellate factfinding is that
the appellate court is likely to be wrong.
The greatest cost of the harmless constitutional
error9 rule is its usurpation of the jury function.
Aside from the likelihood of erroneous factfinding
because a cold record is a poor communicator, an
appellate court is far removed from being a jury,
and jury trials comprise the heart of our criminal
justice system. We are probably better off with
juries making "wrong" decisions than with judges
making "right" ones. 95 The decisionmaking gulf
between three appellate judges reading a transcript
at their leisure in chambers and twelve citizens
locked in ajury room is not bridged by an appellate
judge's intellectual understanding of the reasonable doubt standard. In comparing the appellate
jury to the petit jury some questions should be
asked. Which defendant, let alone the defendant's
lawyer, would demand ajury trial and then allow
an appellate judge to sit on the jury? Even with
the limited voir dire available in most federal
courts, if a lawyer were foolish enough to seat an
appellate judge on a jury, would the lawyer do so
93FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
9 Justice Harlan, in his Fahy dissent, points out that a
nonconstitutional error can be as prejudicial to a defendant as a constitutional error, and in some instances, more
so. 375 U.S. at 94. Professor Saltzburg, supra note 4, at
989-90, makes the same point in arguing for the same
harmless error rule in criminal cases involving constitutional and common error. While the automatic reversal
rule for harmless constitutional error does not suffer from
the same vulnerability to the "appellate review not re-

quired" argument as does harmless common error, the
potential for denial of a jury trial exists as strongly for
common error as it does for constitutional error when the

character of jury justice (as opposed to appellate justice)
is at issue.

9
Justice Harlan, in a rare example of poor judgment,
once suggested that "untrained jurors are presumably

less adept at reaching accurate conclusion of fact than
judges ....
" Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 188-89

(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even if true, the value in
citizen participation may outweigh the value of a decisionmaking system which makes more correct decisions.
In the law generally, and in criminal law particularly,
the societal acceptability of the decision may be more
important than its correctness. Juries represent an insti-

tutional insurance policy for the continued acceptability
of the decisionmaking system.
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without some voir dire? Would the lawyer at least trial in criminal cases. '
find out who thejudge was before failing to exercise
After Duncan, the Court spent some time deciding
a peremptory? 96 Assuming a lawyer who would try exactly how many people were needed for a jury,
a factual defense to a jury of appellate judges, what constituted an impartial jury,'0 2 and how
would he agree to waive summation?9 7 Would that many of those impartial jurors had to agree before
lawyer allow the appellate jury to know that a a criminal verdict was proper. While there was
previous jury found the defendant guilty? Would substantial disagreement, no Justice on the Court
the lawyer agree that group decisionmaking means ever suggested that three is enough to make ajury,
nothing and that the jury members could go back that less than six votes is enough to convict, or that
to their offices and.read through notes at their own appellate judges are diverse enough to constitute a
pace until they reach a decision? Would the lawyer community cross section. Although Williams v. Floragree that jury nullification was of no particular ida'0 3 held that the jury guaranteed by Duncan need
value to the defendant? 9s Any lawyer who might
not be made up of twelve persons, and Apodaca v.
agree to all of the above would not have much
Oregon10 4 allowed that a criminal jury need not be
quarrel with a three-person jury finding the de- unanimous, Burch v. Louisiana'0 5 made it clear that
fendant guilty, two-to-one.
the sixth amendment required a jury as small as
Duncan v. Louisiana,9 decided a year after Chap- six persons to be unanimous before it could return
man, held that the right to a trial by jury was one a guilty verdict.' °6 Furthermore, Taylor v. Louisof those fundamental rights which not even the iana'0 7 and Duren v. Missouri' established that the
existence of state boundaries could destroy. Pre- defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial
sumably it would be one of those rights "so basic jury meant that the jury must be drawn from a
to a fair trial"'" that even Justice Black would
fair cross section of the community. An appellate
consider harmless error analysis to be inappro- court of three, deciding guilt by a vote of two-topriate. In deciding that a trial judge's decision that one is hardly a jury.
Gary Duncan was guilty of simple battery beyond
The effect of the decisions in Harrington and
a reasonable doubt could not be squared with the Schneble, and their approval of the overwhelming
sixth amendment right to ajury trial, Justice White evidence approach to harmless constitutional error
reviewed the history of American juries. He as- is to deny the defendant/appellant a right to a
signed "oppression by the Government" and "protrial by jury. The appellate court, by definition,
tect[ion] ... against judges" as two of the major
sits as a jury and makes a guilt determination
reasons for the insistence upon the right to jury based upon an amount of evidence upon which no
jury has passed. While double jeopardy in the
9A danger exists that when harmlessness is at issue
classic sense is not involved, a certain discomfiture
the appellate lawyer who decides to argue harm is making
his pitch to the jury's "boss," not the jury. If long lies in an appellate court's determination that a
transcripts are to be read, clerks are likely to do the lower appellate court erred in its judgment that an
reading, not judges.
error was not harmless.'0o Lastly, there is, at a
97Because harmlessness is rarely at issue in briefs or at
minimum, some embarrassment in a decision
argument, the defense lawyer never gets to argue the
'0' 391 U.S. at 155-56.
facts and the law to the appellate jury. Even if the
'02 The sixth amendment guarantees, among other
opportunity is there, the judges have not yet read the
record, and the lawyer is arguing from factual thin air. things: " ... trial, by an impartial jury." U.S. CoNrsr.
Additionally, in criminal cases much of the argument for amend. VI.
103399 U.S. 78 (1970) (approving a jury of six).
the defendant is related to the burden of proof. There is
104 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (approving a guilty verdict by
no opportunity to make that argument, and there is some
reason to believe that appellate judges are in more need ten-to-two jury votes).
05 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
of the refresher than some juries. See, e.g., Milton v.
106Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), somehow
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
98
discerned a constitutional difference between six and five,
Jury nullification is not a particularly common
event, and may not often be affected by an evidence allowing a jury of six, but not of five.
'07 419 U.S 522 (1975).
error. However, there may be circumstances in which a
108439 U.S. 357 (1979).
jury failed to exercise its power to nullify the law because
0
the error admitted evidence that dissuaded it from nul' 9 The dissent in Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. at
lification, or excluded evidence which, if heard, would
378, pointed out that no less than four other courts had
have persuaded the jury to nullify.
considered the matter and none had found the error to
99391 U.S. 145 (1968).
be harmless. If each used the "overwhelming" evidence
10o
Justice Black's description of those errors which the test, only the Supreme Court-five-to-four-believed
Court had found to require automatic reversal. 386 U.S.
that the untainted evidence proved guilt beyond a reaat 23.
sonable doubt.
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which says that an error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt: five-to-four.
IV.

SECOND STORY

JoB

ON THE CONSTITUTION

The harmless constitutional error doctrine works
only a petty theft on individual defendants' rights
in specific cases but its consistent application exerts
a more profound effect upon society. The harmless
constitutional error rule, regardless of the test, militates against basic freedoms and controls upon
governmental institutions that operate against individuals. At all levels of the criminal justice system, the harmless constitutional error rule dilutes
the impact of most constitutional criminal procedure decisions of the last quarter century which
preserve individual rights against contrary claims
of necessity by the government. The rule allows an
ad hoc, after the fact, factual judgment by an
appellate court which makes it difficult for an
individual to attack it and diminishes the level of
protection provided by specific constitutional provisions without affording any opportunity to argue
the issue's merits. If, as some claim, many of the
Warren Court decisions of the 1960s were ill-advised, if the society has, indeed, been damaged by
the change in the relationship between the individual and the state as incarcerator, that is a matter
to be addressed on the merits, not through the
procedural backdoor of harmless constitutional error.
Harmless constitutional error is particularly inappropriate because of the special relationship between the Constitution and the courts. All of the
assumptions necessary to support any harmless
error doctrine are inapplicable when the error at
stake abrogates a constitutional right. Any doctrine
which allows an appellate court to identify an error
and then find it "harmless" assumes that the appellate function is limited to the correction of an
inappropriate trial court result. Further, it assumes
the decision will affect the litigants alone." 0 The
harmless error doctrine assumes that any other
interest, other than the correction of an inappropriate trial result, is sufficiently insignificant to
balance unfavorably against the nonconstitutional
value ofjudicial economy."'
1o While the result might affect future and unknown
litigants, it is the litigants in the case or those that may
someday be similarly placed that are affected, to the
exclusion of the public in general.
" A public interest exists for every law, including the
Missouri constitutional requirement which caused the
reversal of Campbell's case for want of a "the" in the
indictment. State v. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 109 S.W.
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At least since Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme
Court obligation of judicial review has been the
lifeblood of the living Constitution. Justice Harlan's Chapman dissent decries what he sees as the
Court's "assumption of what amounts to a general
supervisory power over the trial of federal constitutional issues in state courts," 113 but he is a lone
voice. Justice Black left little doubt that federalism
concerns are insufficient to justify state interference
with rights
emanating from the federal Constitu4

tion.1

The special relationship between the Constitution and the Court, in which each gains its strength
from the other, is unique when the rights in question are those enumerated in the first eight amendments. One does not have to accept Justice Black's
theory of total incorporation 115 to recognize that
the first eight amendments are antimajoritarian
and antigovernment. In the American system, the
courts historically have been the only institution
sufficiently separated from the political system to
act as the preserver of those antimajoritarian and
antigovernmental rights. The cost of that preservation has never been small: "The criminal 116
is to
go free because the constable has blundered."
If certain errors are to be susceptible to harmless
error treatment and others are not," 7 the Consti-

706 (1908). The harmless error rule assumes that whatever that interest may be it is of less weight than the
interest in judicial economy.
1125 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
113386 U.S. at 46-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
114See

note 37 supra.

lnjustice Black argued that the first eight amendments were totally incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and were thereby
applicable to the states. His position, most fully set out in
his dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting), never held a majority of the
Court. Ironically, his position was set out in opposition
to the due process approach of Cardozo, Frankfurter,
Harlan and others, which inquired as to whether the
matter at issue was fundamental to the American concept
of criminal justice. His language in Chapman, "so basic to
a fair trial," comes perilously close to the Cardozo-Frankfurter-Harlan concept of distinguishing between rights
based upon "fundamentalism."
"'People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (1926) (opinion of Cardozo, J.).
"'Justice Black, by his Chapman acknowledgment of
the Court's prior decisions, Justice Stewart, by his desire
to exclude the fourth amendment, and the many commentators by their various selections have all agreed that
there are some constitutional errors which ought to be
subject to the harmless error approach and others which
should not. None has presented a particularly persuasive
reason for discrimination between constitutional errors.
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tution is the only reasonable place to draw the
line. 8 The efficacy of that line is based upon the
assumptions of both the harmless error doctrine
and the system of constitutional jurisprudence.
There are three major differences between nonconstitutional and constitutional rights which demand
distinction between them when the appropriateness of harmless error analysis is at issue.
First, nonconstitutional rights, the abrogation of
which create trial error, are transitory and political.
They are legislatively created, maintained, 'and
changed. Their preservation is ensured by the ultimate safeguard of majority approval, or at least
political process approval. Constitutional rights, on
the other hand, are immune to the political process,
at least as to preservation." 9 Legislators and electorates have no function in the preservation of
constitutional antimajoritarian and antigovernmental individual rights. The courts, rightly or
wrongly, are120the sole institution for maintenance
and change.
Second, nonconstitutional rights likely to be implicated in trial error are, generally, of a kind for

which society has little, if any, interest outside of
the conduct of the trial.' 2' Constitutional rights
often implicate substantial societal interests exclusive of the error in a particular trial. In those cases
where the defendant stands as society's surrogatesearch cases, for instance-society's interest in the
right has nothing to do with the trial result. The
society's interest in the right is furthered, or not,
by the result of the suppression hearing. 1"'
Finally, nonconstitutional rights which are abrogated by trial error are usually neutral. They are
as likely to behefit the government in a given trial
as they are the defendant. Hearsay, for example,
may benefit the government in one instance and
the defendant in another. Constitutional rights,
such as the right to confrontation, which might be
abrogated by a trial error, are always beneficial to
the defendant and consistently restrictive with respect to the government's case. Each of these three
differences has institutional consequences which
differentiate common error from constitutional error when the appropriateness of a harmless error
doctrine is the issue. The harmless constitutional
error doctrine has interfered with the Supreme
Court's task of interpreting the Constitution, and
" 8 justice Harlan compellingly argues that the Chap- may
have, in one instance, changed other interpreman decision, to the extent it conceives "of an application
of harmless-error rules as a remedy designed to safeguard tations without notice.
Harrington and Schneble were both "confrontaparticularconstitutional rights," 386 U.S. at 50 (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added), is unsupportable. As a device tion" cases and represent a line of cases which
to insulate only some constitutional rights from applica- demonstrates two ways in which the harmless contion of state harmless error rules, a federal harmless error
rule has little to recommend it. Neither Black nor Stewart stitutional error doctrine interferes with the orderly
suggests a rationale for the application of the stricter test development of constitutional law. Bruton v. United
to some constitutional rights. Once the judgment is made States," decided one year after Chapman and before
that all constitutional rights are beyond harmless consid- Harrington, overruled Delli Paoli v. United States."'
eration, Harlan's complaint about a failure of reason is Delli Paoliallowed the confession of a codefendant
gone. Perhaps he would disagree with a result which put
all constitutional error beyond the reach of harmless in a joint trial to be offered despite the fact that
error, however, clearly he agrees with the proposition the individual did not testify. The Court held an
that the nature of the Court's relationship to the Consti- instruction to the jury that the confession could be
tution makes the question of the validity of a harmless considered only against the confessing codefendant
error rule a federal constitutional question unaffected by
sufficiently protected the other defendant's right to
the nature of the specific constitutional right.
"9 Concededly, constitutional rights are subject to the confrontation. The Bruton Court, speaking through
political process through the power of amendment, but Justice Brennan, held that the instruction to disthe political activity relates to repeal and addition rather regard would not suffice in protecting the other
than preservation. The political process possibly could
121Obviously, some state rules affect conduct outside
destroy a constitutional right such as the fourth amendment, but the political process of constitutional amend- the scope of the trial, for example, a requirement that a
ment probably could not preserve the right.
confession be signed. Most nonconstitutional trial errors,
120 In the fourth amendment context, a number of
however, will involve rules designed for the conduct of
commentators have suggested that the executive might trials.
protect and preserve the privacy of citizens more effec"'2 This is not intended to imply that society has no
tively than the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Kaplan, The interest in the trial result, but only that it has a distinct
Limits of the Exclusionay Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027
interest in the fourth amendment protection. It is that
(1974). While there might be a chance, it is a little like distinct interest which is not within the assumptions
putting the foxes in charge of the chicken coop. It in- underlying the harmless error rule.
dulges the assumption that there is no need for the
1" 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
A 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
antigovernment provision in the first instance.
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defendant's right to confrontation. In reaching that
conclusion, Brennan made an observation which,
though true, was ignored the next year in Harrington: "We, of course, acknowledge the impossibility
of determining whether in fact the jury did or did
not ignore [the] statement inculpating petitioner in
determining petitioner's guilt. ' ' 125 Although both
Douglas' majority opinion and Brennan's dissent
in Harrington concentrated on the effect of the
decision on Chapman, Harringtonchanged what appeared to be the basis for Bruton: The court can
never be sure of the jury's response to a codefendant's confession, and, therefore, it will take no
chances that the defendant's confrontation right
might be abridged. While Harrington did not overrule Bruton, it certainly did for all "good" government cases. Harrington'sreliance upon "overwhelming evidence" can only mean that the Bruton confrontation right is unnecessary for the apparently
guilty. In Harrington's situation, a statement
which could be construed126
to implicate was held to
fall short of a confession.
In Schneble, the petitioner's "confession" 127 was
more inculpatory than Harrington's, though there
was some question about its reliability.' 28 Justice
Marshall, in dissent, attempted to show that Schneble's reliance upon Harrington was misplaced because Harrington involved a codefendant's confession which was "merely cumulative" of the defendant's "confession" to having been at the scene of
the crime. However unpersuasive that distinction
might have been, Justice Marshall said prophetically what might just as well have been said in
'25 391 U.S. at 136.
126Significantly, the majority did not consider Harring-

ton to be a case of interlocking confessions. The statement
by Harrington was a piece of circumstantial evidence no
different from that provided by a witness who could
testify that Harrington was around, but who could not
testify to any criminal activity.
127 Much of the confusion in Schnebte arises from the
varying views amongst the members of the Court as to
the legality of the confession. Despite the limitation of
the grant of certiorari to the "confrontation" question,
the "confession" split on the Court has an obvious effect
on the opinions.
128 Schneble's first "confession" was not reliable. His
second "confession" was. The second confession occurred
after what the dissent characterized as "a series of bizarre
acts by the police." 405 U.S. at 434 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Florida Court found the second confession
was sufficiently "attenuated" to allow its presentation to
the jury. The jury's handling of the confession, and
determination of whether it was voluntary, was part of
the disagreement between the majority and the dissent
as to the harmlessness of the offer of the codefendant's
statement.
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Harrington:"Unless the Court intends to emasculate

Bruton, supra, or to overrule Chapman v. California,
supra, sub silentio,
then I submit that its decision is
2
clearly wrong."'
Which of the precedents, Bruton or Chapman, was
the target in Schneble became clear in Parker v.
Randolph.s3° Justice Rehnquist, the author of Schneble, writing for a plurality in Parker, resurrected
Delli Paoliand limited Bruton to those cases in which
the implicated defendant "made no extrajudicial
admission of guilt."' 1 31 The Parkerplurality opinion,
on confrontation grounds, was inconsistent with
Bruton, relying instead on the two harmless constitutional error cases, Harrington and Schneble. Parker
did to Bruton what Marshall suggested that Schneble
did to Bruton, assuming Schneble to be a confrontation, not a harmless error, case. Justices Stevens,
Brennan, and Marshall found Rehnquist's confrontation position untenable. Justice Powell took
no part in the decision. Justice Blackmun specifically rejected Justice Rehnquist's position on Bruton
but voted with him because he believed that the
error was "harmless."
Justice Blackmun's use of harmless constitutional error in Parker is a classic example of an
appellate procedural doctrine blocking the resolution of an important constitutional question. Had
harmless constitutional error not been available to
Justice Blackmun, he probably would have joined
Justice Rehnquist on the merits, providing a majority for the Rehnquist position. While he rejected
Rehnquist's Bruton position to make his harmless
error point, 3 2 his harmless error reasoning is difficult to distinguish from Rehnquist's Bruton position. While one might have substantial disagreement with Rehnquist's Parkerposition, a constitutional position ought not fail of a majority for a
harmless error doctrine.
Ironically, harmless error is based on a concern
for judicial economy. Had Blackmun prevailed,
still another hearing and another round of appeals
would have resulted, all in the interest of judicial
economy.sss The right of confrontation is a consti2

: 9 Id. at 437 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30442 U.S. 62 (1979).
131 Id. at 74.
132Id. at 77 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
33

Justice Blackmun, concurring in Moore v. Illinois,
434 U.S. 220, 233 (1977), begins to hint at a cure worse
than the disease for the extra round of hearings. He
considered the victim's in-court identification of her
assailant and said: "[Tihe conclusion that it was harmless
seems to me to be almost inevitable." Id. at 234. While
he went on to say that it was for the lower court's
determination in the first instance, his apparent willing-
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tutional right. It runs consistently against the government and in favor of the defendant. It depends
upon the courts for its definition. Because the
harmless constitutional error doctrine exists, and
was able to draw the vote of a Supreme Court
Justice, the status of the right and the case, Bruton,
which defined it is still in doubt. If Bruton does not
state the law of confrontation, and arguably it does
not, ajudicial economy doctrine that does not work
ought not deny us the knowledge.
When a Supreme Court Justice can frustrate the
constitutional process by refusing to decide a matter on the merits in favor of a procedural doctrine
invented to avoid retrials over omitted "the's," the
loss is exceeded only by the danger of that same
doctrine changing the constitutional process without warning. The plurality in Parker was not doing
anything that the majority in Harringtonand Schneble had not done under the guise of "harmless"
error. The difference is that Harringtonand Schneble
gave poor notice that the Bruton doctrine would not
apply to cases in which there was an extrajudicial
statement from the defendant complaining of the
confrontation failure. The harmless constitutional
error doctrine is a particularly evil erosive mechanism. Assuming for a moment that methods to
erode constitutional doctrines without destroying
them are useful tools in the law, harmless error
analysis is not one of those useful tools. Harmless
error analysis does not address, nor give the opportunity to address, the merits of the doctrine being
eroded. The case for gradual change in constitutional propositions by erosion is not made by resort
to a doctrine that gives proponents and opponents
of the constitutional proposition no opportunity to
speak to the merits and courts no opportunity to
signal where they are going.
Milton v. Wainwright"" is an example of the evil
effect of the harmless constitutional error doctrine
when five Justices are willing to avoid the issue as
Justice Blackmun did in Parker.George Milton was
indicted for murder, had a lawyer, and was in jail
awaiting trial. He had made some statements that
were less than fully reliable.sss The police were
ness to reach the conclusion quickly, coupled with Chief
Justice Burger's procedure in Milton v. Wainwright, 407
U.S. 371, to consider harmlessness as a new matter in the
Supreme Court, suggests the possibility of an increase in
harmlessness decisions from the Supreme Court as a
method to decide each case on its narrowest ground.
'34407 U.S. 371 (1972).
135Chief Justice Burger's opinion does not mention
that the "overwhelming" evidence was a set of "confessions" taken over an eighteen-day period, during which

sufficiently concerned that they sent an officer into
Milton's cell, posing as a prisoner. During the two
days that Milton and the policeman, Langford,
"roomed" together, Milton made damaging statements to the policeman which Langford related to
thejury at trial. The District Court viewed Milton's
habeas complaint about the statements as raising
the issue presented in Massiah v. United States,13 6 but
denied Milton any relief because Massiah had never
been held to be retroactive.
Chief Justice Burger, speaking for five members
of the Court in Milton, did not address the Massiah
issue.' 37 He assumed arguendo that there was error,
and wrote an eight-page opinion explaining why
the hypothetical error was harmless. Justice Stewart, the author of Massiah, speaking for four members of the Court, took vigorous exception to the
lower court's view of Massiah, the majority's failure
to consider Powell v. Alabama,is1 and the Court's
conclusion that the error-whatever it was-was
harmless. One hardly needs to take sides on the
merits of the Massiah retroactivity issue to demonstrate that the harmless error doctrine is an abomination when constitutional matters are at stake in
the Supreme Court. The retroactivity of Massiah
remains unanswered and the continued strength of
Powell is now in doubt because five out of nine
members of the Court were able to classify an
unidentified error as harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Laying aside the value of five out of nine
persons finding anything true beyond a reasonable

the defendant was held incommunicado and questioned
almost every day, often for hours at a time. He denied
his guilt for the first ten days. See 407 U.S. at 383. Chief
Justice Burger gave no consideration to the possibility
that the jury may well have been unwilling to convict
based upon the suspicious confessions, and gave them
great weight only in view of the "harmless error"-the
"voluntary" conversation with the cellmate.
'36 377 U.S. 201 (1964). United States v. Henry, 100 S.
Ct. 2183 (1980), decided eight years after Milton, pre-

sented almost exactly the same Massiah-relevant facts.
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Henry detailed
an understanding of Massiah with which four Justices
took issue on one basis or another. Nothing in the Chief
Justice's opinion justifies, explains, or even mentions the
eight years in which the Court left everybody else up in
the air as to the meaning of Massiah.
137Justice Stewart, the author of Massiah, described it
as a "counsel" case in Milton, while the-district and circuit
courts read it to be about "voluntariness." 407 U.S. at
380 (StewartJ, dissenting). The ChiefJustice's excursion
into harmless constitutional error as a matter of first
instance in the Supreme Court left the disagreement,
along with the retroactivity question, unresolved.
' 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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doubt, substantial questions remain unanswered
and new ones are raised unnecessarily. In addition,
the Supreme Court spends its valuable time making a factual judgment about a long record rather
than examining the law of the case, or, at least, the
law of some other case. The doctrine of harmless
error damages the Constitution by failing to address important issues as in Milton. It also causes a
misallocation of court time which could be better
spent performing tasks other than reading a long
record. The harmless constitutional error doctrine
in the Supreme Court is an unwarranted and
dysfunctional impediment to the constitutional
process.
The constitutional damage from the harmless
constitutional error doctrine is not limited to the
Supreme Court and its use of the doctrine to avoid
constitutional judgments as in Parker, or to make

constitutional judgments without real notice as in
Schneble. Appellate courts, both state and federal,
have occasionally been less than enthusiastic about
certain constitutional decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Harmless constitutional error provides such courts an opportunity to "destroy or
dilute constitutional guarantees."1 39 The doctrine

is unmatched as a tool for the secret theft of
constitutional rights. A finding that a constitutional error is harmless is almost beyond question
or review. While there are some fact circumstances
and trial situations so obvious that it is incredible
that any appellate judge would make a harmless
error finding, 4 ° most such findings are based upon
long and relatively inaccessible records. Further,
the majority opinion will generally reflect those
portions of the record which support the "harmless" determination. If there is no dissent on the
139Justice Harlan's Chapman dissent recognized the
danger and reserved the eventuality of state court dilution of federal constitutional rights as a basis for his
concurrence with a decision which would prohibit the

activity by imposition of a federal standard. 386 U.S. at
50.

140A

rare example of a harmless constitutional error
decision which is so preposterous on its face that no
particular resort to a record is required is found in Allison
v. Gray, 603 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1979). The error was a
failure to allow the defendant to present his alibi evidence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court and the federal
district court apparently believed that the government's
case was so overwhelming that there was no need for a
jury to listen to and believe the defendant's case. Short of
this kind of a case, in which the court finds the failure of
the government to allow a trial to be harmless, harmlessness is not easily seen by the reviewer without benefit of
a full record.
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law, there is not likely to be a dissent on the factseven if a judge might have some question about
the facts. 4 '
If a state or federal appellate court chooses to
use the harmless constitutional error as a tool to
emasculate a constitutional right through a consistent finding of harmlessness in a series of cases,
it is likely to succeed without question. Although
prosecutors who handle cases within a jurisdiction
may watch closely to see which area of error is
becoming "harmless,' ' 142 commentators, the people
most likely to be concerned with a pattern of
dilution, are unlikely to be alerted, given the lick
of legal mistake with which to quarrel. A given
defendant may press through the habeas corpus
maze to appeal a state determination of harmlessness or appeal to the Supreme Court from a circuit
court harmlessness decision, but the likelihood of a
successful appeal of a harmlessness affirmance is
slim. Given the number of harmless constitutional
error decisions, and the difficulty in finding reversals of those decisions by a higher appellate court,
the potential of the harmless constitutional error
doctrine for unmaking law has not gone unnoticed
by appellate tribunals. 43 While there may be some
other explanation for the marked increase in the
use of harmless constitutional error, avoidance of
141Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, exemplifies
the situation where there is a quarrel about the factual
finding of harmlessness which would not likely have
occurred but for the legal dispute. Even in Harrington and
Schneble, the dispute on the facts is only in furtherance of
the complaint about the test the Court is adopting.
142 The problem of prosecutorial deterrence is considered at text accompanying notes 154-159 infra. Justice
Cameron of the Arizona Supreme Court has observed
that the result of consistent signals to prosecutors is
prosecutorial reception of the signals: "[I]f a particular
error is declared to be harmless a sufficient number of
times, then the cumulative effect of such holdings will be
that both the prosecution and the trial judge will tend to
ignore the error and commit it again." Cameron & Duke,
When HarmlessErrorIsn't Harmless, 1971 LAw & Soc. ORD.

23, 42.
143
Whether the absence -or presence of second level
reversals of harmless determinations would be the more
unhappy circumstance is unclear. Given the large number of harmless cases, it seems fair to conclude that the
small number of second level reversals is directly related
to the difficulty of review of a factual judgment. On the
other hand, a significant number of second level reversals
on harmless error would be sorry proof that lower appellate courts were, indeed, hiding behind harmless error as
a means to dilute constitutional rights. The other possibility, that there is an incredible increase in the number
of trial mistakes that do not matter in fact, has little to
support it in logic or evidence.
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constitutional responsibility is not without precedent. 1 "
Harmless constitutional error presents special
problems for trial courts and prosecutors that are
not a concern when the harmless error is "common." Because harmless constitutional error always
operates in favor of the government and against
the defendant, the doctrine puts unique pressure
on a conscientious trial judge or prosecutor to
ignore a citizen's acknowledged constitutional
rights5 based upon the "no harm-no foul" the4

ory.1

Trial courts make the first, and often most influential,
decision concerning the constitutional
rights of the defendant. It is the trial court, and
particularly the state trial court 147 where the cost
144Justice Powell, concurring in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972), had no hesitancy in ascribing
"the failure of many state courts to live up to their
responsibilities in determining on a case-by-case basis
whether counsel should be appointed" as a motive behind
the landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
145Although demonstrating the effect of any decisionmaker's benign neglect is difficult, the art form from
which the phrase is taken, professional basketball, presents an interesting analogy. Before the "no harm-no
foul" type interpretations of the rules by modern referees,
basketball was considered a kind of sporting dance inappropriate (in those days) for "men." Anyone watching
the modem no harm-no foul game can attest that a
portion of that contact sport resembles a war zone. It is
difficult for one trained in the law to assume that prosecutors and judges would not be at least as quick as
basketball centers and referees to adjust to this kind of
development.
146The first judgment is the standard against which
other possibilities are considered. The trial court's judgment about both the facts and the law often influences
decisions three or four appellate layers later. See, e.g.,
Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690 n.9 (1980)
(quoting trial judge), where the trial judge's statement
that it was "entirely understandable that [the officers in
the police vehicle] would voice their concern" made it all
the way to a United States Supreme Court opinion and
served as a part of the foundation for the proposition that
there was no "interrogation." See also Note, Fifth Amendment-The Meaning of Interrogation Under Miranda, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 466 (1980).
147Justice Harlan consistently maintained-that the
circumstances of the states were very different from the
circumstances of the federal government. His argument
in Chapman, that federalism should be the first constitutional principle, persuaded no one on the Court. Regardless of the impotence of the argument for law, the fact is
that there is a huge difference between the circumstances
and relationships of a federal trial court and a state trial
court. The discussion which follows assumes a trial in a
state trial court, the forum in which the vast majority of
criminal litigation takes place.

of the exclusion of evidence, for instance, is most
immediately appreciated. Justice Frankfurter's admonition that "the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not
very nice people,"'" is rarely lost on a trial judge,
who is usually looking over the bench at the "not
very nice" person. Unfortunately, there is no
method for documenting the effect of the harmless
constituti6nal error doctrine on trial courts. Aside
from the fact that most trial court opinions go
unpublished, the issue of "harmlessness" is never
officially raised at the initial confrontation over the
loss of a constitutional guarantee.
Some observations about the operation of trial
courts and their place in the community might
help fill the void left by the failure of formal
opinions. Acknowledging the danger in anecdotal
proof, I doubt that I am the only lawyer in the
land who, when citing a precedent for error, has
had the trial court review the precedent and say:
"Counsel, I agree that the court held that to be
error. But they said that it was harmless, and I
think that this case is virtually the same as your
precedent."' 49 Predictably, the trial court focuses
on the precedent's harmlessness determination
rather than on the determination that there was
indeed an error.
Most constitutional matters arise in special pretrial hearings under the glare of some publicity."50
Significantly, appellate courts decide such matters
far away and after the heat is off. Trial judges live
in, socialize with, and are, by design, subject to the
influence of the community.' 5' What ought such a
14'United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1968).
149This composite response reflects some experience in
response from trial judges commenting upon precedent
which had good news and bad. The good news was the
error, the bad news was that it was harmless. While a
careful advocate would find precedents which showed
only the error, the opportunity for that selection decreased rapidly after Chapman as more and more cases
found both error and harmlessness.
150Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979),
demonstrates that the pretrial hearing isoften of as much
public interest and concern as the trial. The trial court's
decision to close the hearing may reflect something more
than a concern for an impartial jury. The Supreme
Court's willingness to allow the closure may evidence an
unstated understanding of the pretrial pressures on judicial decisionmakers. See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980) (trial must be open to
the press); Note, Constitutional Right of Access to Criminal
Trials, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 547 (1980).
' Even in those "enlightened" jurisdictions which
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judge do if a defendant charged with murder, and
against whom there is overwhelming evidence of
guilt, makes a motion to suppress evidence because
of a violation of the Constitution? Justice Cardozo's
reminder 52 of the high price society pays for a
decision to exclude evidence is best understood by
a trial judge. To that problem for the trial court,
add the proposition that appellate courts may find
constitutional error to be "harmless" and that in a
relatively similar case the highest court of the state
has once done just that. The trial court can read
the highest court of the state to be holding that the
error in question will always be harmless. 53 It may
read the court to be signaling a change in the law,
and it may be correct. Last, and for constitutional
protection, probably worst, the trial court may be
correct in its view that the instant case and the
precedent are factually so similar that the same
harmless constitutional error determination would
probably obtain upon review. The result will be
the same, regardless of which view the trial court
takes. Either because the error is always harmless,
or the law is changing, or because it can accurately
predict that this particular error in this context will
be harmless, the trial court will consciously commit
constitutional error, safe in the "instruction" to do
so from the state's highest court. The result is a
doctrine which, in the guise of judicial economy,
almost requires the trial court to initially ignore
the enforcement of constitutional rights. Significantly, the hypothesized activity does not depend
have adopted plans for judicial selection other than the
election contest, some form of community veto exists
upon the performance of judicial trial function. Most
jurisdictions maintain the election of trial judges, and
while the upset of a sitting judge is rare, it does happen.
More importantly, the trial judge, as opposed to the
appellate judge, suffers or enjoys all of the personal
concerns for acceptance within the community of which
the judge is not only an integral, but an important and
visible part.
152See note 116 & accompanying text supra.
153At least one court has determined that a constitu-

tional error can never be harmful. In State ex rel. MeMannis v. Mohn, 254 S.E.2d 805 (W. Va. 1979), the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that violation of the principle in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
(1976) (defendants may not be forced to attend trial in
prison garb), was harmless constitutional error when the
defendant was on trial for a crime committed while in
prison, and when the defense failed to raise its objection
until after calling its first witness. Whether the decision
might have been justifiable under a due process theory,
or whether Estelle is distinguishable (the court's opinion)
was beside the point. The West Virginia Court chose to
create the anomaly that certain activity was always error
and always harmless.
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upon any ulterior motive upon the part of the trial
court. Quite the contrary is true. A respectable
argument can be made that when a local trial
judge is faced with the possibility of turning a
"murderer" loose for the violation of a constitutional right which an appellate court has said in
the same context led to a harmless constitutional
error, the judge should err in favor of community
safety. A "correct" result of guilty, given the certainty, likelihood, or possibility that the appellate
court will say that the trial court's error was harmless is more appropriate than any other result. It is
also easier, and in this situation "easier" is not
necessarily pejorative.
The result of the harmless constitutional error
doctrine at the trial court level is to encourage the
diminution of rights against the government for all
individuals against whom the state has an overwhelming case.' 54 Harmless constitutional error
then becomes the presumption rather than the
exception. The fault is not with the trial court but
with the concept that the abrogation of a constitutional right that runs consistently against the
government can be harmless.
As difficult as it is to isolate the effect of the
harmless constitutional error on trial courts, it is
even more obscure with prosecutors. There is, nevertheless, the nagging suspicion that the major
denial of constitutional guarantees resulting from
the harmless constitutional error doctrine relates to
its effect upon prosecutors. Again, one need not
posit the evil-minded prosecutor to demonstrate
that harmless constitutional error steals significant
rights by its effect upon the prosecuting authority.
Prosecutors, as with all lawyers, are trained to
represent their client to the limit of the law. The
profession considers it unethical and unthinkable
for the advocate to cross over the line, and malpractice not to approach that line as closely as
possible in pursuit of the client's just cause. The
prosecutor's duty to "justice,' ' 15 may raise some
154The difference between the "effect of the evidence"
test and the "overwhelming evidence" test may be of
significance in this situation. At least with the former
test, the trial court is not encouraged to prejudge the
strength of the prosecution's case and make an error/no
error decision based upon that judicial prejudgment of
guilt.
'S A sense of uneasiness pervades the common suggestion that prosecutor/advocates are somehow different

from other advocates and can psychologically suffer pulling selected punches in the interest of justice. See, e.g.,
Standards Relating to the Prosecution and the Defense Function,
ABA
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doubt about how he should respond to a constitutional violation, but the prosecutor's instincts as a
lawyer combined with the harmless constitutional
error doctrine, demand that the prosecutor abdicate any role as a positive force for the maintenance
of constitutional guarantees.15
When constitutional rights are at issue in the
courts, prosecutors have a consistent position.
Either as the result of the facts they are given or as
a matter of government or personal policy, the
prosecutor is arguing in court that an alleged violation of a constitutional right is not a violation,
157
The
or if it is, should not vitiate a good case.
same is not necessarily true when nonconstitutional
rules are at stake. The result is that the prosecutor
contributes to the erosion of doctrines in the courts
by maintaining a consistent position with respect
to the harmlessness of constitutional error. To the
extent that any litigant can find the opportunity
or mechanism to argue harmlessness to the appellate tribunal, it is the prosecutor. Furthermore,
since the prosecutor is a consistent litigant against
opponents with one-case or one-issue interests, the
prosecutor can, over a series of cases, maintain a
position which is beyond the power of any single
opponent to effectively confront.
The harmless constitutional error doctrine even
affects the prosecutor in the investigation and trial
stages. When an advocate is faced with a trial
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, he has
the inclination and opportunity to watch the cases
to see which errors are consistently harmless and
which are not. Where the trial task and individual
("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely
to convict."). It is difficult to include under that umbrella
the suggestion that a prosecutor is somehow bound not
to take advantage of evidence which that prosecutor
knows will be considered "harmless" even if it might be
technical constitutional error.
"56The prosecutor's potential as a force for the preservation of constitutional values is twofold. While the
prosecutor has an obvious role in refusing to present
evidence which will result in reversible error, in many
instances the prosecutor also can be effective in directing
law enforcement policies and activities.
157 Any suggestion that the office of prosecutor presents
a unique circumstance in which the office holder has an
obligation to suppress constitutionally infirm evidence or
at least refuse to argue its harmlessness is based on a
misunderstanding of the adversary system in fact, and
probably in theory. See, e.g., Milton "v. Wainwright, 407
U.S. 371, in which at least one prosecutor argued "harmlessness first" all the way to the Supreme Court. It is the
prosecutor's continuing stake in the merits and ability to
profit from consistent "harmless" decisions in lieu of a
victory on the merits that helps to make the doctrine of
harmless constitutional error particularly pernicious.

temperament demand every available weapon, the
doctrine presents a situation in which only the
most foolish of prosecutors would avoid the risk of
using the error. Every time an error is declared
harmless in a particular situation, it diminishes the
risk to the prosecutor in the use of the evidence or
1
the technique. a The lessening of the risk is added
into a formula which favors risk-taking based upon
the doctrine alone. In a sense, the doctrine encourages the prosecutor to use the evidence or the
technique in every case. Initially, there are three
15 Situations in which prosecutorial conduct may be
influenced by "harmless" decisions are difficult to identify'. It may be reckless to ascribe motive from a consistent
line of cases, but a series of decisions in the Minnesota
Stipreme Court leaves the distinct impression that prosecutors respond to what they read.
In State v. Jones, 277 Minn. 174, 152 N.W.2d 67
(1967), the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct. Among other
items the prosecutor argued to the jury the failure of a
witness to answer certain questions. Id. at 183, 152
N.W.2d at 74. The reversal was, however, the result of
multiple sins. State v. Russell, 282 Minn. 223, 164
N.W.2d 65, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 850 (1969), concerned
an improper argument wherein the prosecution alluded
to the defendant's failure to call witnesses. The court
said, "we do not approve," but refused to reverse because
the remainder of the evidence was so overwhelming. Id.
at 228, 164 N.W.2d at 68. In each of the next seven years,
the court had at least one occasion to tell prosecutors that
it was error to comment upon a defendant's failure to
call witnesses, and in no instance did it reverse for that
reason. Most of the cases come from the same prosecutor's
office. All but one came from the three major metropolitan prosecutors' offices. While it cannot be shown that
the continued comment on the failure to call witnesses is
a direct result of the failure of the court to reverse, the
court kept affirming and the prosecutors kept commenting. See State v. Spencer, 311 Minn. 222, 248 N.W.2d 915
(1976) (defendant's testimony); State v. Redd, 310 Minn.
145, 245 N.W.2d 257 (1976); State v. Fields, 306 Minn.
521, 237 N.W.2d 634 (1976); State v. Meadows, 303
Minn. 76, 226 N.W.2d 303 (1975); State v. Caron, 300
Minn. 123, 218 N.W.2d 197 (1974); State v. White, 295
Minn. 217, 203 N.W.2d 852 (1973); State v. Bell, 294
Minn. 189, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972).
Two related lines of cases show the same tendency for
"repeat business," or prosecutorial conduct which is "disapproved" but for which the Court continuously refuses
to reverse. See generally State v. Shupe, 293 Minn. 395,
196 N.W.2d 127 (1972). Shupe disapproved the prosecutor's implication to the jury that he would have provided
more evidence but for some circumstance. In at least
three subsequent cases the same comment was disapproved without reversal. In State v. Thomas, 307 Minn.
229, 239 N.W.2d 455 (1976), the court acknowledged
that its admonition to prosecutors in a 1933 case regarding the misrepresentation of the presumption of innocence was going unheeded. It did not reverse but said it
would henceforth. Eight cases later it had not reversed
and gave no indication that it ever would.
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possibilities: (1) the evidence or technique does not
involve any error, (2) if the evidence or technique
involves error, it will be harmless, and (3) the
evidence or technique involves error that will cause
a reversal because the remainder of the evidence is
not "overwhelming." What should the intelligent
and conscientious risk assessor do? The first two
possibilities present no question. If there is no error
there is no problem, and if the error is harmless the
only problem is the time and expense of an appeal.
The result is the same: a legal conviction. Convictions which are legal are, after all, what the society
pays the prosecutor to obtain. The third choice is
the problem. The court has defined a doctrine of
harmless constitutional error which says to a prosecutor that if the case is not overwhelming any
error will cause a reversal, and if it is overwhelming,
no worry. The prosecutor then looks at the case
and determines that it is not very strong. Use of
the evidence or technique has two chances of success-no error and harmless-and one chance of
failure. By the Court's definition of "harmless,"
that one chance of failure demands that the evidence or technique be crucial to the prosecutor's
case. The prosecutor has no advocate's choice
which mitigates in favor of not using the evidence
or technique. Even if the prosecutor believes the
case is strong, the likelihood is that the evidence or
technique will be used. The odds are still two-toone. Further, the advocate's predilection to cover
every base is reinforced by the doctrine's admonition: if the evidence or technique is not needed by
the advocate it is not likely to cause a reversal. 59
The effect of the rule upon the government's
advocate is particularly significant. Prosecutors are
among the most deterrable of groups. If any of the
Supreme Court decisions of the last quarter century
have a deterrent effect, prosecutors are the prime
group to respond. Not only are they affected directly by reversals, they are sufficiently trained and
have sufficient time to fully appreciate the prece1s Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), was,
according to Justice Douglas, just such a case. His view,
represented by Justice Marshall's dissent in Schneble v.
Florida, 405 U.S. at 433, was that the Harrington evidence was merely cumulative. The confession in Milton
v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, seems another example of
just one more piece of evidence which a prosecutor placed
upon an already very large pile. The best proof that
prosecutors are likely to use all they have, even if they
don't need it, is the number of times that appellate courts,
by finding harmless constitutional error, have said that
the prosecutor used evidence that wasn't needed.
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dent.' The harmless possibility, then, tempts a
group that might in its own self interest be a
significant force for preserving the constitutional
right and, in addition, influence law enforcement
to do the same.
V. No RHYME

NOR REASON

The prosecutor's position with respect to a constitutional right which may lead to error exemplifies the last, and most ironic, problem with the
harmless constitutional error doctrine. Harmless
error exists only as a means of judicial economy,
and harmless constitutional error does not even
economize judicial time or activity. 16 1 The judicial
economy theory assumes that a rule which allows
reversal only when the error is substantial will
diminish the number of retrials and thus cut
62 judicial time and speed matters to conclusion.'
The harmless constitutional error doctrine, as it
affects the prosecutor, contributes to court congestion. Although quantification is impossible, the
doctrine clearly causes some diminution in the
prosecutor's concern that abrogation of a constitutional right will cause a reversal. Consequently,
the prosecutor will use the evidence or technique
in a number of cases which, without the doctrine,
he would not. Each such case represents one trial
which, without the doctrine, might not have taken
place. In the event of a conviction, an appeal is
almost guaranteed because there is an obvious
constitutional error. If the prosecutor was right and
the error was, indeed, harmless, the net effect of
the use of the evidence under the shield of the
doctrine is one more appeal. If, on the other hand,
the prosecutor's guess was wrong, and the error
was harmful, there is one more appeal and one
more trial, where, without the doctrine there might
'60 One of the major complaints about the extension of
the exclusionary rule has been that policemen have neither the training to understand it nor do they find
themselves in situations in which their action can be
affected by an arcane judicial precedent. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Prosecutors, on the other hand, are the specific group at which

exclusionary deterrence might properly be aimed.
161Empirical proof of economy is virtually impossible.
Professor Saltzburg, supra note 4, at 1032 n. 158, presents
an interesting view of the de minimus effect of harmless
error in criminal trials in the federal system. Nothing in
either the cases or the literature presents a detailed
argument for the proposition that harmless constitutional
error presents the same judicial economy claimed for
harmless common error.
'6 See generally State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102 (Minn.

1979).
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have been no trial in the first instance. There is no
instance in which the harmless constitutional error
doctrine encourages prosecutors not to file cases
which would not otherwise be tried, and many
chances for the filing of additional cases because
the doctrine exists.
The effect of the doctrine on trial courts also
contributes to court congestion and works against
the rationale that supposedly supports the doctrine.
To the extent that the doctrine encourages a trial
judge to allow evidence even though it is likely
error to do so, the doctrine destroys another opportunity to diminish litigation. In some cases, if the
trial court suppressed the evidence, the prosecutor
would decline to proceed. To whatever extent the
doctrine discourages the suppression, it increases
the number of trials. In addition, each time the
failure to suppress involves a constitutional error,
it almost guarantees an appeal and another full
record hearing in the appellate court before the
litigation is laid to rest because the error was
harmless.
Moreover, it is not clear that the harmless constitutional error doctrine contributes to judicial
economy at the appellate level. Undoubtedly, some
cases are not retried because the court found error
but found it harmless. How large that number
might be is as difficult to ascertain as some of the
other possibilities which have been discussed. It is,
however, fair to observe that in order for the error
to be harmless the case against the appellant must
be "overwhelming" without the error. If the government's case is that good-and the defendant
has already seen it succeed once-the chance for a
plea after the appeal is enhanced. If the court finds
the error and does not have the harmless error
doctrine to fall back on, the government is more
interested in the defendant's plea than it was before
trial. Whatever the number of retrials avoided by
the harmless constitutional error doctrine, it is
diminished by the increased likelihood of a plea if
the doctrine is abandoned.
Importantly, when the error in question is constitutional rather than common, any resultant trial
economy is offset by the certainty of the increase in
appeals. While a defense attorney may persuade a
defendant that a truly insignificant common error
is not an adequate foundation for an appeal, that
same result is not likely when both the lawyer and
the defendant know the Constitution is implicated.
The net economy effect of the doctrine upon appellate courts and trial courts cannot be left without noting that the issue of harmlessness raises yet

one more determination from which the defendant
might take yet one more appeal. For every trial
that the harmless determination might save, there
is an appeal to be spent."s
A last unique aspect to constitutional error differentiates it from common error when the judicial
economy argument is made for a harmless error
doctrine. The major reason for including the criminal trial within the original harmless error rule
was the prevailing practice among defense attorneys of putting error in the record as a hedge
against a guilty verdict.' 64 The effect of that system,
which provided the only litigant with an interest
in never reaching a decision a technique to forever
forestall the reaching of a decision, was to never
reach a decision. Constitutional error, however, is
beyond the control of the defense lawyer for the
most part. It is difficult to place a bad search, a
bad statement, a bad lineup, the failure of counsel,
or other government error into the record. The
need for a harmless error rule to avoid retrials
caused by defendants does not exist for constitutional error.
VI. CONCLUSION

The harmless constitutional error doctrine shares
neither history nor logic with the harmless error
doctrine from which it was wrenched in Chapman.
It offers neither logic nor method for finding proof
for the proposition that judicial economy results
from the operation of the doctrine. Indeed, the
doctrine arguably contributes to the amount of
judicial time spent on criminal cases. Unfortunately, the doctrine enjoys great popularity with
appellate courts as a mechanism for reducing the
strict enforcement of criminal constitutional procedure rules.
The effect of the doctrine upon precedents defining constitutional criminal procedure-their creation, maintenance, and change-is devastating. As
to constitutional rights there should be no harmless
error.165 The Court should adopt a rule of auto'63 Constitutional error presents the added possibility
of federal habeas corpus. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976) (ending federal habeas corpus in fourth
amendment cases). Insofar as many jurisdictions have
two levels of appellate courts, and the federal habeas
procedure might involve three levels of review, a strong
argument can be made that it takes more time going up
the ladder to resolve the harmlessness issue than it would
take to go back down and try the case without the error.
164 See note 14 supra.
65
'
ChiefJustice Burger concedes that thejudicial economy realized by saving one jury trial is outweighed by
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matic reversal, fulfill its function with respect to
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the Constitution, and make its judgments in full
light of the undiluted effect of the rules it makes.
A terrible symbolic price is paid for maintenance
of a harmless constitutional error rule. There is a
visceral, if nonlegal distaste for the proposition that
an individual's loss of a constitutional guarantee,
protected only by the courts, can somehow be
"harmless." An improper search of a home should
not be equated with a state's omission of the word
"the" from the defendant's charging papers. Law-

yers should pause at the proposition that government can violate a basic restriction upon itself and,
through a court, tell the individual who was the
beneficiary of the restriction: "no harm-no foul. ' i 66
There is something disquieting about the admission that constitutional rights are so often abrogated that we need a separate doctrine to excuse
some of them so that our decisionmaking system
will not break down. Finally, there is some shame
in trying to explain how the loss of a constitutional
guarantee is harmless beyond a reasonable doubtfive-to-four.

the interest in safeguarding the rights of the individual
defendant. Writing for a unanimous court in Standefer
v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1999 (1980), the ChiefJustice
held that the civil doctrine of nonmutual estoppel would
not be applied in criminal cases because the "important
federal interest in the enforcement of the criminal law"
outweighed the "economy concerns that undergird the
estoppel doctrine." Id. at 2008. In distinguishing the
criminal from the civil, he concluded with an approving
quotation of the Court of Appeals rationale for that
distinction:
"The purpose of a criminal court is not to provide a
forum for the ascertainment of private rights. Rather

it is to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law while at the same time
safeguarding the rights of the individual defendant.
The public interest in the accuracy and justice of
criminal results is greater than the concern forjudicial economy...."
Id. (emphasis added) The judicial economy concern in
both the nonmutual estoppel situation and in the harmless constitutional error case is exactly the same: one jury
trial.
166"No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own
cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least
interest or bias." THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton).

